

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

13 March 1981

NOTE FOR:

FROM : A/NIO/W

SUBJECT : Poland

1. Attached for your information is an internal paper which we sent to Dick Lehman yesterday.

2. I thought the meeting went fairly well, despite lack of a decision on the SWS. Nothing progresses very rapidly, I fear.

3. Dick Kerr was very impressed with the AIS and wondered if CIA could somehow get access to it or remote a terminal out here. I suggested he have a chat with you.



Attachment

12 March 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO for Warning

SUBJECT : SOYUZ-81—Backdrop for a Declaration of National Emergency and
Confrontation with Solidarity?

1. I believe there is at least a 50-50 chance (probably greater) that the Warsaw Pact command staff exercise announced on 10 March will be used to provide an intimidating show of force in support of a crackdown on Solidarity militants, KOR dissidents, and other "counterrevolutionaries" in Poland. The breakpoint

2. Overwhelming Soviet pressure was brought to bear on Kania and Jazdzewski by a delegation representing the entire spectrum within the Soviet leadership—Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Tikhonov, Ustinov, and Rusakov. This display of determined unity was intended to serve notice that Kania could no longer evade a decision to crack down by trying to play the non-interventionist faction in the Soviet leadership (Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Gromyko) which had prevailed at the Warsaw Pact summit on 5 December against the hardline interventionist faction (Andropov, Suslov, Ustinov). Kania could hardly miss the symbolism—the Soviets had employed the same device against the hapless Dubcek when the entire Soviet Politburo, except Kirilenko and Polyansky, confronted the Czechoslovak leaders at Cierna on 29 July 1968 and again at Bratislava on 3 August, with a slightly smaller array of Soviet hierarchs.

3. Kania had resisted right up to the 4 March showdown session. In his 24 February speech to the Soviet Party Congress, Kania reaffirmed that the "road of a political solution..." is the "fundamental direction of our activity," and he

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restated the Warsaw Pact/^{summit} formula by thanking the CPSU "for their faith in our party and nation being able to resolve the Polish problems independently...." He and Jaruzelski attempted to evade harsh Soviet pressure by returning to Warsaw on 26 February, but they had no choice but to acquiesce in a peremptory Soviet summons to return to Moscow for further talks on 4 March.

4. In what must have been the most brutal session between the Soviet leadership and a "fraternal ally" since Cierna, Bratislava and Moscow in 1968, Kania was compelled to bow to an unequivocal ultimatum that the Polish leadership must either move against Solidarity, KOR, and reformists in the party or face the consequences of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact military intervention. Since the overriding imperative of both Kania and Jaruzelski is to avert Soviet intervention at all costs, they had no choice but to agree to change policy. The communique issued after the talks committed the Polish leaders to a policy which "will steadfastly press for fully overcoming anarchy and disarray." The Soviets invoked not only the Brezhnev Doctrine but also a geopolitical justification—the urgent need to thwart the hopes of "imperialism and internal reaction" that the crisis in Poland "will result in a change in the alignment of forces in the world, in a weakening of the socialist community, the international communist and the entire liberation movement." The Soviets also countered the Polish leaders' fears and doubts about their capacity to prevail in a confrontation with "antisocialist forces" by declaring that the 26th CPSU Congress had expressed confidence that the Polish communists "have the possibilities and strength to turn the course of events, to eliminate the dangers threatening the socialist gains of the Polish people." In phrasing worthy of Stalin, the communique declared that the talks had "confirmed the common approach of the sides to the question under discussion." (As Stalin would say, "Clear, one would think.")

5. The first concrete signal of a shift in Polish tactics occurred on 5 March when the authorities served a summons on Jacek Kuron informing him that he was under

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investigation for "suspected slandering and ridiculing the Polish nation, the communist system, and authorities." On the following day, Adam Michnik of KOR.. managed to evade a summons and is now under the protection of "worker guards." Also on 6 March, Leszek Moczulski and three other members of the anti-Soviet nationalist "Confederation for an Independent Poland" were arrested. In case any of the fraternal allies had failed to get the message, Sovetskaya Rossiya on 7 March reported an article in the Austrian communist newspaper Volksstime which alleged that KOR, in collaboration with Moczulski's Confederation, had "infiltrated its people into leading organs" of Solidarity, and then ominously observed that, "So far, the Polish Government has tried to avoid a confrontation, but now it will apparently be forced to take the appropriate steps."

6. It must be assumed that the Polish leaders expected that Kuron and Michnik would either resist a summons or violate its terms. (Kuron refused to report to the Warsaw police on 10 March). Their actions will provide a pretext for followup moves to arrest them and other "counterrevolutionaries." The arrests of Kuron and Michnik will be the provocations that trigger a confrontation with Solidarity. Walesa has stated privately and publicly that Solidarity would strike to protect dissidents associated with the union should they be arrested. Spreading strikes called by Solidarity will, in turn, provide the justification for the use of Polish security and military forces to occupy factories and mines, communications facilities, and key highways and ports.

7. Kania and Jaruzelski almost certainly insisted in Moscow that only Polish forces be used in the coming crackdown and that no Soviet or allied forces would be required. They have well-founded fears that a conspicuous presence of foreign troops would spark a violent nationalistic reaction that could quickly escape control.

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8. Sunday, March 22, may be D Day. Elements of the Polish 1st and 9th mechanized divisions apparently will participate in a Polish national force exercise, K10N-81, from 21 to 23 March. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Polish authorities almost certainly anticipate that the arrest of Kuron, Michnik and perhaps Solidarity militants will result in an immediate general strike in which workers will occupy their work places. In order to avoid very high risks of violent confrontations, the regime may time its moves so that Polish security and military forces, under a Declaration of a State of National Emergency, will preempt Solidarity by occupying key industrial facilities, mines, ports and communications facilities on Sunday, March 22nd—a work-free day.

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10. I recommend that OSR examine these exercise plans with a view to exploring various options for the use of Soviet/Pact forces if Polish forces prove to be incapable of coping with contingencies created by the crackdown on Solidarity. [REDACTED]

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
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


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SUBJECT: SOYUZ-81--Backup for a Declaration of National Emergency
and Confrontation with Solidarity?

Distribution:

- Copy 1 - NIO/W
2 - [redacted]
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Series B

- 1 - [redacted] DIA
2 - [redacted], OPA (16 Mar 81)

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